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THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON A 
JOINT PRODUCT MODEL OF SMUGGLING 
ABSTRACT 
Extending the seminal work of Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) on 
smuggling, Pitt (1981) developed a joint export smuggling model to 
investigate the welfare effect of illegal transactions. This paper 
develops an extension of Pitt's original model which allows many of 
the interesting features of the Bhagwati and Hansen model to be re­
examined within a joint product model of smuggling framework. The 
extension is made through the following modifications to Pitt's 
assumptions: 1) firms that export are free to engage in joint 
product smuggling or strictly legal trade; and 2) uncertainty is 
introduced into the model via active government enforcement. 
The modifications enable the model to reexamine the ambiguous 
welfare results derived in the papers by Pitt, and Bhagwati and 
Hansen. The model explains why the ambiguous welfare results were 
derived and demonstrates that the welfare effect of smuggling can 
indeed be positive, even if smuggling incurs a real resource cost. 
I. Introduction. 
The paper by Pitt (1981) on illegal transactions in 
international trade questioned the results of the seminal paper on 
illegal transactions by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973). The purpose of 
this paper is to explore how Pitt's welfare results are affected 
when risk and the firm's attitude toward risk are introduced in 
conjunction with the firm's freedom to choose between strictly 
legal trade and joint product smuggling. The modified model of 
joint product smuggling developed in this paper permits many of the 
interesting features of the Bhagwati and Hansen model to be re­
evaluated within a joint product framework. This is accomplished 
by allowing government enforcement to play an active role in the 
model without incurring a real resource cost to combat smuggling. 1 
Active enforcement generates a crime theoretic framework for the 
analysis of joint product smuggling in this paper. 2 
In this essay Pitt's model of joint product export smuggling 
is modified to incorporate active government enforcement of the 
smuggling laws. Active enforcement is the assumption used to 
introduce uncertainty into the joint export smuggling model. The 
paper then develops a decision mechanism which evaluates the 
uncertainty and provides a set of decision rules for the firm to 
1 It is a common assumption in the smuggling literature that 
enforcement effort against smuggling incurs a zero real resource 
cost because the legal system of country is already in place. 
Thus, increased enforcement effort against smuggling requires only 
a reallocation of resources within the legal system. 
2 Martin and Panagariya (1984) were the first to introduce 
the crime theoretic approach to the analysis of smuggling. 
1 
follow in making its decision to smuggle or engage in strictly 
legal trade. 3 The firm's attitude toward risk affects this 
decision process. 4 The model requires the smuggling firm to 
include the real resource costs of smuggling and expected 
punishment in its output price. These two factors affect 
production and output price if the firm smuggles. The firm's 
smuggling decision determines the long run equilibrium domestic 
price ratio. The results of the model indicate that: 1) it is the 
firm's attitude toward risk in conjunction with the real resource 
cost of smuggling that determines the welfare effect of smuggling; 
2) if firms are risk neutral or risk averse and they decide to 
smuggle, then smuggling is welfare enhancing under certain 
conditions; and 3) the assumption of a significant real resource 
cost is only a partial explanation for the ambiguous welfare 
results found in the earlier smuggling literature. 5 
II. Assumptions. 
3 The concept of a firm decision mechanism which determines 
whether a firm smuggles or not was first developed in a paper by 
Fausti (1992). 
4 Smuggling models which incorporate variable firm risk 
preference can be found in papers by Scholer (1989) and Fausti 
(1992). 
5 In the papers by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Pitt (1981), 
Bhagwati (1981), and Martin and Panagariya (1984), the real 
resource cost of smuggling is the only factor responsible for the 
ambiguous welfare results. Sheikh (1989) argues that ambiguous 
welfare results can only occur if firms are assumed risk 
preferring. Scholer (1989) and Fausti (1992) argue that if the 
attitude toward risk varies over the traded goods industry, 
smuggling can be strictly welfare enhancing. 
2 
The basic assumptions of Pitt's model of smuggling are the 
starting point for this paper. Pitt assumes the small country case 
with the terms of trade fixed. The country produces two traded 
goods, an exportable (X) and an importable (M), employing primary 
factors purchased in competitive markets. Production and trade are 
carried out by identical firms. Legal and illegal trade in exports 
is carried out by the same firm. The law of one price holds in the 
domestic economy. 
The following additional assumptions are made so that a model 
of smuggling incorporating uncertainty can be developed: 1) firms 
that smuggle may not incur a significant real resource cost; 6 2) 
smugglers (firms) are natives and therefore their utility functions 
are embodied in the country's social welfare function; 3) export 
taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 4) firms must bear the 
risk of illegal activity and they cannot insure against criminal 
penalties; 5) exporting firms have a choice between strictly legal 
trade or smuggling, with the choice based on profit maximization; 
and, 6) if the domestic exporting firm decides to smuggle, it will 
then produce a joint product, and legal trade will act as a cloak 
for the firm's illegal activity. The firm can use four methods to 
smuggle exports: a) under-invoicing of exports; b) falsely declared 
6 Cooper (1974) and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) argue that 
smuggling may not impose any significant real cost on society 
over legal trade. 
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exports; c) under-assessment of exports; and d) clandestine 
smuggling of unreported production. 7 
III. A Joint Product Model of Smuggling. 
In addition to the assumptions made in the previous section, 
it is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to a modified 
Pitt smuggling function, 
s* = G (L, S). (1) 
The variable (S*) is the quantity of good (X) made ready to be 
smuggled. The variable (S*) in this model is defined as exports 
made ready for smuggling across the domestic border or, in other 
words, smuggling attempted. The variable (L) is the quantity of 
good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity of good (X) input 
into smuggling activity. The function (G) is strictly concave and 
a twice differentiable linear homogeneous function. The function 
(G) is assumed to have the following properties: 
Gt � o, Gu. s o, 
1 � G8 � 0, G.. S O, 
G (O, S)=O, 
G (L, O)=O, 
s-s* � o, acs-s*)/aL <O, acs-s*)/as >o. 
(3) 
(2) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Assumption (2) states that the marginal smuggling product of 
legal trade used in smuggling is non-negative and is declining in 
(L). Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the smuggling 
input (S) results in a positive but less than unit increase in 
1 Deardorff and Stolper (1990) discuss the widespread use of 
smuggling method (d) in a number of African countries. 
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actual amount of the export made ready to be smuggled, and the 
marginal product of (S) is declining. Assumption (4) states that 
legal trade is a necessary input into smuggling or the probability 
of detection is one. Assumption (5) states that firms can choose 
to engage in legal trade only. Assumption (6) prohibits the real 
resource cost of smuggling from being negative. The real resource 
cost of smuggling (s-s*) is the smuggler's selling cost in excess 
of its legal trade alternative selling cost (excluding taxes). It 
is assumed that the actual magnitude of smuggling•s real resource 
cost is exogenous to the model. However, a change in one of the 
endogenous variables (L) or (S), affects the marginal resource cost 
of smuggling. A one-unit increase in (L), ceteris paribus, reduces 
the marginal real resource cost of smuggling. A one-unit increase 
in (S), ceteris paribus, increases the marginal real resource cost 
of smuggling. 
In the literature, smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect is the 
direct result of how the real resource cost assumption is modeled. 8 
A negative welfare effect results from an excessive real resource 
cost incurred by smugglers, while an insignificant real resource 
cost produces a positive welfare effect. As an example, Pitt 
assumes that the cost of smuggling is composed of either penalties 
and confiscation or a mixture of a real resource cost and penalties 
and confiscation. His welfare result is ambiguous because the 
8 Again see Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Pitt (1981), Martin 
and Panagariya (1984), Scholer (1989), Sheikh (1989), and Fausti 
(1992). 
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composition of the cost mix is unknown. We alter Pitt's assumption 
and assume that the difference between (S) and (S*) is a real 
resource cost incurred from the use of cloaking tactics employed to 
evade detection. 9 
Smuggling is assumed to incur a risk of detection (p) , (l�p�O) 
such that (p=l) if (L=O) . The expected value of illegal goods 
intercepted as they are moved over the border is (p . pf. s*) or (Pf•s*) 
if (L=O) . The variable (Pf) is the world price of exports. The 
expected value of successful smuggling is [ (1-p) Pf•S*]. The 
variable (F) is a multiple of the value of intercepted illegal 
goods which is imposed as a fine, (F�l) . The expected cost of 
interception to the smuggler is (p•F•Pf•s*) and is at least (Pf•s*) 
if (L=O) . Expected smuggling revenue net of interception cost is 
equal to [ (1-p•F) . pf. s*] and is non-positive if (L=O) . 
The expected value of output price per unit of smuggled good 
at the border for the smuggling firm is E[P8 ] = (1-p•F) •Pf, and is 
non-positive if (L=O) . The expected value of revenue per input unit 
of the smuggled good at the border for the smuggling firm is 
E[P8]• (S*/s) = (1-p•F) •Pf• (S*/s) , and is non-positive if (L=O) . The 
expected value for the output price per unit of legally exported 
goods is E[pLJ = pf. (1-t) = pL, and represents the legal tax 
distorted price for exports. The variable (t) denotes the export 
9 The real resource cost, for example, may take the form of: 
1) special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods; and 2) 
the transport cost of shipping unreported production out of the 
country via clandestine ports. 
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tax. It is assumed the firm knows the values of these risk 
factors. 
It is assumed each firm has a decision to make. The firm can 
engage in joint product smuggling or it can sell its output at the 
legal domestic export tax distorted price (pL), as implied by the 
assumption G (L, 0)=0. 10 If the firm decides to smuggle, it receives 
the weighted average price for its total output. 
If the firm decides to become involved in joint product 
illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery. 
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on variables 
(p, y•, F). The probability of apprehension (p) is determined by 
the government. It is assumed the firm's probability of being 
caught is (p) , if it engages in cloaking activities. If it does 
not cloak its illegal activity, then the probability of 
apprehension is equal to one. The variable (F) determines the 
monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the firm by the 
government if it is caught in the illegal act of smuggling. Fines 
are considered a transfer to the government. As in Pitt's paper; 
profit maximization in production implies producing on the 
production possibility curve where the marginal rate of 
transformation equals domestic relative prices (P*). The variable 
(Y9 ) represents profits from joint product export trade. 
Smugglers are assumed to be profit maximizers. 
profit for the smuggling firm is given by equation (7), 
Expected 
10 Strictly legal trade profits are derived from equation (7) 
when it is assumed S=O. 
7 
E(Y8)=Pt•G(L,S) - (p) •F•Pt•G(L,S) + pt. (1-t) •L - P*• (L+S) •11 (7) 
The term [Pt•G(L,S) (p)•F•Pt•G(L,S)] denotes expected 
smuggling revenues; pt•(l-t)•L represents revenues for legal trade. 
As in Pitt's article, firms earn zero economic profit in the long 
run. Setting equation (7) to zero and solving for p* generates an 
expression for the long run equilibrium domestic price ratio as a 
weighted average of prices received for goods legally exported in 
conjunction with goods illegally exported: 
p* = [(1-p•F)•Pt•(S*)]/(L+S) + [Pt•(l-t)•(L)]/(L+S). (8) 
The exporting firm's decision of whether to engage in strictly 
legal trade (S=O) or engage in smuggling and produce a joint 
product (L+S*) will determine the long run equilibrium domestic 
price ratio (DPR). If firms smuggle, then Pitt's "price disparity" 
result is generated (P*>PL). 
IV. The Role of Uncertainty in the Smuggling Decision. 
The act of smuggling incurs a risk. The exporting firm's 
attitude toward the risk will effect its decision to smuggle or 
engage in strictly legal trade. This section applies the 
methodology developed by Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) to address 
the uncertainty issue in this paper. 
Joint product illegal trade profit represents an uncertain 
prospect and legal trade profit represents a certain prospect. The 
term (ff) represents the difference between the expected value of 
illegal profit and legal profit; it follows that there exists a 
11 The first order conditions can be found in appendix (A). 
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(ff*) such that the firm is indifferent between legal and illegal 
trade. The value of (ff*) depends on the firm's attitude toward 
risk. Applying Pratt's results we can define (ff*) as a risk 
premium and the functional form of (ff*) is given in equation (9), 
ff/ = (1/2) ·VAR(Y) • -{U" (Y) + U' (Y)}. (9) 
The measure of absolute risk aversion is defined as 
-[U" (Y) /U' (Y)], and is employed as the measure of the firm's 
attitude toward risk in this section. The following conditions 
arise from equation (9): 1) the value of (ff*) for the firm will be 
negative if (U">O); 2) positive if (U"<O); and 3) zero if (U"=O). 
This implies, respectively, that the firm prefers, averts, or is 
neutral toward risk. In this paper the risk preferring case is not 
addressed. The variable (ff*) represents the insurance premium the 
firm would be willing to pay if it could insure itself against 
criminal penalties. Therefore, (ff*) represents the minimum value 
of risk premium necessary to make the firm indifferent to 
smuggling. This implies that, in equilibrium, at the margin, 
smugglers that are risk averse earn higher profits than in legal 
activities. Smugglers who are risk neutral earn the same amount of 
profits as in legal trade.12 Hence, (ff*) 
Cooper's "threshold of law abidingness. "13 
the firm will become involved in smuggling. 
serves as proxy for 
Whenever (ff>ff*), then 
12 Becker (1968) used this approach to examine the effect of 
uncertainty on criminal behavior. 
13 See Cooper (1974), for a discussion of the factors which 
influence a firm to smuggle or continue in legal trade, p.186. 
9 
In the paper by Sheikh (1989), a positive equilibrium level of 
economic profit is considered a "reward" to smugglers who are risk 
averse as compensation for the mental anguish incurred by 
participating in a risky venture. In this paper, the risk premium 
(v*) represents the smuggler's compensation. As in Sheikh's paper, 
there is a unique perfectly competitive equilibrium in this model 
where the cost associated with the amount of mental anguish is 
exactly equal to the reward for risk (v*). 
Assume the exporting firm reacts to uncertainty as described 
above. Long run economic profit is then equal to zero for the risk 
neutral firm. It follows that economic profit is positive for the 
risk averse firm. This assumption modifies equation (7) and long 
run equilibrium expected profit for the smuggling firm is: 
E (Y•) = pf•G (L,S) - (p)•F•Pf•G (L,S) + Pf• (l-t) •L -
p* • (L+S) = v*. (10) 
Solving equation (10) for p* generates a new expression for the 
(DPR): 
p* = [ (1-p•F)•Pf• (S*)] / (L+S) + [Pf• (l-t)• (L)] / (L+S) -
v* / (L+S) • (11) 
Long run equilibrium domestic relative price is now a function 
of the weighted average price of joint product smuggling, which 
includes the risk premium (v*). The firm's decision to engage in 
joint product smuggling or strictly legal trade is determined by 
the firm's decision criteria condition: 
max[Pf• (l-t), pf• (S*+S) • (1-p•F) - v*/S]. (12) 
10 
Condition C12) states that if the expected value of revenue per 
input unit of smuggled good, less the per unit risk premium, is 
greater than the per unit revenue that could be earned by selling 
CS) through legal channels, then all firms smuggle and DPR=P* •
14 If 
not, then the DPR=pL. The following statements outline the firm's 
decision mechanism for engaging in joint product smuggling or the 
strictly legal trade alternative: 
pf.s*• Cl-p•F) - 7r* 
if pf· cs* ts>· c1-p ·F>-
if pf· CS* /S) • Cl-p •F)-
pf• S • C 1-t) , 
7r* /S 
7r* /S 
< pf. Cl-t), 
> pf. Cl-t), 
if pf· cs* /S) • Cl-p •F)- 7r* /S = pf·Cl-t), 
C13) 
then S=O, DPR is pL, C14) 
then S>O, DPR is p*, ClS) 
then the type of firm activity is indeterminate, pL=P*. C16) 
Statement C13) compares total revenue CPf•S*•Cl-p•F)) coming from 
illegal trade minus the risk premium to the total revenue CPf•S•Cl-
t)) which would be earned by channeling CS) through legal channels. 
Statements C14-16) are derived from C13).15 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality CJr*=O) and a real cost 
associated with smuggling cs-s*>O), the CDPR) is determined by the 
firm's decision to smuggle or engage in strictly legal trade. The 
firm's choice is based on the decision criteria found in statements 
14 Condition C12) is derived from equation Cll). Condition 
C 12) makes a comparison of revenue coming from illegal trade 
CPf•S*•Cl-t)) to the revenue which would be earned by channeling 
illegal goods through legal channels, CPf•S•Cl-t)). 
15 The introduction of the firm's decision mechanism to the 
analysis of smuggling eliminates the possibility of obtaining the 
strictly ambiguous welfare results found in Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
C1974) or Pitt C1981). 
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(14-15). statement (16) reveals the necessary condition for the 
coexistence of legal trade only firms (S=O) with firms that smuggle 
(joint product exports). This model, unlike models in the previous 
literature, requires the smuggling firm to account for the real 
resource cost incurred by smuggling in the firm's output price 
structure. However, if the firm decides to smuggle, welfare may not 
be enhanced due to the real resource cost. 
The real resource cost of smuggling in this model is equal to 
pf. (s-s*) and represents the total welfare loss associated with 
smuggling evaluated at world prices. The negative welfare effect 
can be divided into two parts: 1) a negative effect on prices and 
therefore production; and 2) a loss in government revenue. The 
negative price effect (1-p •F) .pf. (s-s*) is internalized by the 
smuggling firm and is reflected in the firm's output price. 
Therefore, the negative price effect which is generated by just a 
proportion of the real resource cost is taken into consideration 
when the firm makes its decision to smuggle or engage in strictly 
legal trade. The welfare loss due to a real resource cost not 
accounted for in the smuggling firm's output price is the value of 
lost government confiscation revenues that would have accrued if 
(s-s*i:::so). The welfare loss not accounted for by the firm can be 
considered a dead weight loss to society (DWL) and it is equal to: 
DWL = (p •F) .pf. (s-s*). (17) 
The overall welfare effect of smuggling depends on whether 
additional revenues accruing to the firm from the act of smuggling 
12 
outweigh the negative welfare effect of the dead weight loss due to 
the real resource cost. 
A comparison of the welfare level attained when all risk 
neutral firms smuggle to the welfare level achieved when all firms 
engage in strictly legal trade can be determined by answering two 
questions: 1) what effect does smuggling have on the domestic 
price ratio; and 2) is the total social value of exported goods 
smuggled (S*) greater than the total social value of those exports 
if (S) were shipped through legal channels? The first question is 
answered by statements (14) through (16) , smuggling will only occur 
if expected smuggling revenue is greater than or equal to legal 
trade revenue, which implies (P*�pL) . The second question can be 
answered by first assuming (P*>PL) ,  then by rearranging statement 
(13) I 
pt. 5*. (1-p•F) - fl* - pt. 5. (1-t) > 0. 16 (18) 
If (P*>pL) , then (18) states that the smuggling firm receives a 
higher total value for its exports by engaging in illegal trade. 
The firm, however, does not consider the (DWL) to society generated 
by the real resource cost associated with smuggling. For smuggling 
to increase the total social value of exports in comparison to the 
strictly legal trade alternative, statement (19) must be true, 
pt. 5*. (1-p•F) - fl* - pt. 5. (1-t) - pt. (p•F) • (s-s*) > O. (19) 
If statement (19) is true, then the change in total revenues 
generated from smuggling over non-smuggling is greater than (DWL) , 
16 Note, when it is assumed that firms are risk neutral then 
(fl*=O) • 
13 
and the total social value of exports increases. Simplifying (19) 
we have (20), 
pf· cs*/s) > pf. (1-t) + pf. (p ·F) + fl*/s. c20) 
In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement (15) , it is clear 
that (20) is the stronger condition. Which indicates that it is 
possible for firms to decide to engage in smuggling and have the 
act of smuggling reduce the total social value of exports. If 
however, the per unit revenue of smuggling input is greater than 
the combined per unit value of: 1) the legal trade revenue 
alternative for (S) ; and 2) expected punishment, then smuggling 
increases the social value of exports. We can now assert that 
statement (20) is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk 
neutral firms to engage in smuggling and increase the total social 
value of exports over the non-smuggling alternative. 
An analysis of the social welfare effect of smuggling, 
however, must also consider the effect smuggling has on the (DPR) . 
For this purpose an indirect utility function (V) is introduced. It 
is assumed (V) can be used as a proxy for social welfare. Assume 
welfare is a function of the (DPR) and income (Y) . It is assumed 
that an improvement (increase) in (DPR) increases social welfare. 
It is assumed that income is positively related to the total social 
value of exports. The total social value of exports includes both 
private and public sector revenues generated by the export trade. 
Assume all other income sources are held constant and enforcement 
effort does not incur a real resource cost. Under these 
14 
assumptions the following indirect utility function is defined as 
V (DPR, Y), and has the following properties; av/aDPR>O, av/aY>0. 17 
If statement (15) is true then ·firms will smuggle. If 
condition (20) is also satisfied, then the welfare effect will be 
positive. This is due to the fact that the change in domestic 
price ratio and the change in the total social value of exports are 
both positive, and welfare improves via the social welfare function 
(V). The welfare effect of smuggling, however, is ambiguous if 
condition (20) is not met. This ambiguous result is the outcome of 
the (DPR) still increasing, but (Y) declining. This set of results 
establishes a stronger argument in favor of smuggling than the 
ambiguous welfare results obtained by Bhagwati and Hansen, and 
Pitt. Their ambiguous welfare results are the consequence of 
smuggling either having a strictly positive or strictly negative 
effect on welfare, depending on the magnitude of the real resource 
cost. Given that the magnitude of the real resource cost is 
unknown in their papers, they conclude that the welfare effect is 
ambiguous. In this paper, smuggling does not have a strictly 
negative effect on welfare. The welfare effect is strictly 
positive or ambiguous when the real resource cost exceeds the costs 
associated with legal trade. In the joint product model, smuggling 
activity will become indeterminate or end before the welfare effect 
17 The indirect utility function (V) has the following 
properties: 1) (V) is continuous at all DPR>O, and Y>O; 2) (V) is 
non-decreasing in (DPR) and (Y); and 3) (V) is homogenous of degree 
zero in (DPR) and (Y). It should be noted that an increase in the 
(DPR) implies an improvement in domestic relative prices. For a 
discussion of the properties of the indirect utility function see 
Varian (1984). 
15 
of smuggling becomes strictly negative. Unlike their analysis, 
however, this paper provides the mathematical condition necessary 
for the ambiguous welfare result to occur, otherwise smuggling has 
an unambiguous positive welfare effect. 
smuggling coexisting with strictly legal trade can occur when 
(P*=F'). If smuggling is coexisting with strictly legal trade, then 
the change in the domestic price ratio is zero and the change in 
the total social value of exports is negative as (19) indicates 
since (Pt •s* •{l-p •F) - pf •S • (l-t)=O). In this situation {16), 
smuggling either ends or the welfare effect is negative. However, 
in this case the existence of strictly legal trade and/or smuggling 
is indeterminate. This result mirrors that attained by Bhagwati 
and Hansen when (P*=F') , and their conclusion of "the less smuggling 
the better" holds. 
If it is assumed that the real resource cost of smuggling is 
insignificant {S*/S=l), with penalties and confiscation 
representing the significant cost to the smuggling firm, then 
Pitt• s strictly positive welfare result is reproduced in this 
model. 18 statements ( 13) and ( 15) indicate that the firm will 
smuggle only if export revenue earned from smuggling is greater 
than export revenue from strictly legal trade, in this case the 
welfare effect is strictly positive. Statement {16) expresses that 
legal-trade-only firms (S=O) may coexist with firms that smuggle 
18 This is a strong assumption for this model, and is made only 
to discuss Pitt's results under this assumption within the context 
of this model. 
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(joint product) only when the value of expected punishment equals 
the export tax, which implies the export price received from both 
types of trade are equal. If smuggling exists in this situation, 
then the welfare effect is neutral. This situation allows both 
types of firm activity to coexist in the Pitt framework. 
The implications of these results are: 1) if the expected 
punishment associated with smuggling is less than the export tax, 
all firms smuggle; 2) without a significant real resource cost 
associated with smuggling, the welfare level for the "all firms 
smuggling" situation is greater than the non-smuggling alternative 
due to smuggling•s relative price effect; and 3) the welfare effect 
of smuggling is dependent on the level of expected punishment 
(p·F) .1, 
In the previous example of a risk neutral firm not incurring 
a real resource cost, it was demonstrated that the firm was 
indifferent in the choice between strictly legal trade or smuggling 
when ( t = p • F) • For this specific case the actual profit 
differential (ff) is equal to zero, and the risk premium (ff*} 
required by the risk neutral firm is equal to zero. The risk 
averse firm, however, requires (fl':i:!:ff*) to engage in smuggling. 
suppose for example, that the actual risk premium being generated 
when a firm smuggles (S*) in lieu of exporting (S) through legal 
channels is equal to: 
19 Without a significant real resource cost to smuggling, the 
cost of smuggling to the firm represents just a transfer of revenue 
to the government. The aggregate rate of transformation in trade in 
this situation is the free trade terms of trade as in Pitt's paper. 
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(21) 
For the risk averse firm ("*) is positive. If (") is greater than 
("*), then the firm will smuggle as indicated by statement (15). 
The effect of smuggling on social welfare depends on if the risk 
premium earned by smugglers is greater than the (OWL) associated 
with smuggling. In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement 
(15), it is clear that it is possible for firms to decide to engage 
in smuggling and have the act of smuggling reduce the total social 
value of exports. If, however, the per unit revenue of smuggling 
input is greater than the combined per unit value of: 1) the legal 
trade revenue alternative for (S); 2) expected punishment; and 3) 
the risk premium, then smuggling increases the social value of 
exports. We can now assert that statement (20) is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for risk averse firms to engage in smuggling 
and increase the total social value of exports over the non­
smuggling alternative. 
If condition (20) holds, the welfare effect of smuggling by 
risk averse firms is positive. This result occurs because both the 
(DPR) and (Y) increase. Income increases because the total social 
value of exports in the presence of smuggling is greater than the 
non-smuggling alternative. If (20) is not true, then the welfare 
effect of smuggling is ambiguous. The results of the risk averse 
case mirror the risk neutral case. 
The next welfare issue to be addressed is when smuggling and 
strictly legal trade coexist. This situation is stated in (16). 
The coexistence of the two types of trade can only occur when if 
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[P* = pl+w*/ (L+S)]. This implies that the law of one price breaks 
down and allows a type of parallel market structure to develop. 
The (DPR) is now composed of a weighted average of (P*) and (pL). 20 
The effect on the total social value of exports for this case 
is again determined by (20). Condition (20) reveals that the total 
social value of exports, if firms smuggle, is less than the total 
social value of exports for the legal trade alternative. The 
welfare result for this case is ambiguous: The (DPR) increases and 
income declines and therefore the welfare effect of smuggling is 
ambiguous when smuggling coexists with strictly legal trade. This 
result implies the "less smuggling the better" result of Bhagwati 
and Hansen does not hold when firms are risk averse. 
The next issue to be addressed is the effect of increased 
enforcement on smuggling and welfare. starting with the 
assumptions that there is not a significant real resource cost 
associated with smuggling and firms are risk neutral, increased 
enforcement will have a negative effect on the (DPR) if (p•F < t), 
and eliminate smuggling when the level of expected punishment 
becomes greater than the export tax. 21 Equation (8) and condition 
(12) verify the last statement: 1) if enforcement is increased, 
20 This type of parallel market structure is type of market 
structure which develops in many lesser developed countries when 
smuggling is present. The development of this type of market 
structure is discussed in the empirical paper by Cooper (1974) and 
the theoretical paper by Fausti (1992). 
21 The following partial derivatives derived from equation 8: 
ap* I a p I ap* I aF, are negative. However, the indirect affects due to 
changes in the enforcement variables on L and s are ambiguous. 
Therefore, I will assume the direct effect dominates. 
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then {P*) declines as equation (8) indicates; and 2) if the value 
of {P*) declines below {pL), then condition {12) states that all 
smuggling will end. Under the "no real cost" assumption, increased 
enforcement has a negative impact on welfare due to its negative 
effect of the {DPR). 
Relaxing the "no real cost" assumption, the welfare effect of 
smuggling is shown to be either ambiguous or strictly positive. 
The welfare result is dependent on the real resource cost, the 
value of expected punishment and the risk premium {,r*=o). The 
welfare effect of increased enforcement is ambiguous {negative) if 
the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous {positive). Relaxing 
the assumption of risk neutrality, for the risk averse case, when 
smuggling has a positive {ambiguous) impact on welfare, the welfare 
effect of increased enforcement is negative (ambiguous) • The 
policy conclusion concerning increased enforcement to reduce 
smuggling in this paper contradicts the policy conclusion of the 
"the less smuggling the better" found in the earlier literature. 
The results derived in this paper cast doubt on the economic 
welfare argument for the eradication of smuggling which was the 
implied policy conclusion in the earlier literature. 
The next issue to be discussed is the results contained in a 
paper by Sheikh (1989). Sheikh argues that the ambiguous welfare 
results derived in the earlier literature are the direct result of 
smugglers being risk preferring. This paper's model demonstrates 
that when the presence of smuggling results in an ambiguous welfare 
outcome, it is due to the assumption of a large real resource cost, 
20 
not to the assumption of risk preferring behavior by firms. 22 
Sheikh also asserts that incorporating risk by itself lowers 
welfare and thus all previous models over-predict the positive 
impact of smuggling on welfare. This assertion is only true when 
firms are risk averse. However, it is not the inclusion of risk, 
but the assumption of risk aversion that lowers welfare. 
point is discussed next. 
This 
The final issue to be discussed is the long run equilibrium 
results of the model. This paper examined two firm risk preference 
states: 1) risk averse firms; and 2) risk neutral firms. The 
results of the model demonstrate that long run equilibrium profit 
and (DPR) are effected by the state of nature assumed about firm 
risk preference. In the risk neutral case, long run economic 
profit is equal to zero. The long run domestic price ratio is 
composed of a weighted average of (P5 ) and (PL). Under the 
assumption of firm risk aversion, long run economic profit is 
positive. However, it is assumed that (11*) represents compensation 
for the mental anguish suffered by firms due to the risk associated 
with smuggling. Thus, excessive profit in the non-competitive 
sense is not being earned. Comparing the two states, the long run 
equilibrium (DPR) is lower for the risk averse state. The risk 
averse state, therefore, reduces welfare when compared to the risk 
neutral state. However, under both states of nature it is possible 
for smuggling to have a strictly positive effect on welfare. The 
22 It should be noted that an excessive real resource cost will 
cause all smuggling to end this paper's model. 
2 1  
state of nature effect in this model is consistent with the trade 
literature on uncertainty. 23 
23 For a discussion of the effect of uncertainty on prices, 
output, and welfare see Batra (1975) . 
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V. Summary. 
A general equilibrium joint product model of smuggling 
incorporating features found in the papers by Bhagwati and Hansen, 
and Pitt was presented in this paper. The results of the paper 
indicate that: 1) a significant real resource cost will preclude 
smuggling activity from occurring; 2) if smuggling begins, it can 
have a strictly positive welfare effect when compared to the legal 
trade alternative; 3) firms that smuggle can coexist with firms 
that engage in strictly legal trade and if firms are risk averse 
the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous; 4) increased 
enforcement against smuggling can have a negative welfare effect; 
and 5) the real resource cost, expected punishment, and firm risk 
preference all play a role in determining the welfare effect of 
smuggling. 
In conclusion, the presence of smuggling is just a 
manifestation of the economic reality that a tariff is a second 
best commercial policy instrument and should be avoided when 
formulating commercial policy goals. The answer to the smuggling 
problem is not increased enforcement, but the replacement of the 
tariff with a more suitable commercial policy instrument. 
VI. Appendix (A). 
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation 
(7) are, 
aY/aL = (1-p ·F) ·Pf ·Gi. + pf ·(l-t) - p* = o, 
aY1as = c1-p ·F> ·Pf ·G. - p* = o. 
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(la) 
(2a) 
The term (Pt), is the fixed international terms of trade and 
(t) is the ad valorem export tax rate. First order conditions (la) 
and (2a) state that the marginal cost of an additional unit of 
tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, be it legal or 
illegal trade. An additional unit of legal trade will result in 
additional legal revenue Pf • (l-t) and additional smuggling revenue 
(1-p •F)•Pf ·Gi.· 
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